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FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS: 
MAINTAINING JAIL SECURITY WHILE STRIPPING DETAINEES 
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
NINA GLEIBERMAN∗ 
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,1 the Supreme Court of the 
United States considered whether a strip search policy conducted on 
a pretrial detainee—before entering the general jail population for a 
minor traffic-related offense—violated his Fourth2 and Fourteenth3 
Amendment rights.  The Court deferred to the judgment of correc-
tional officials who devised the search policies4 and held that the strip 
search was constitutional, striking a balance between inmate privacy 
and the security needs of correctional institutions.5 
Although maintaining safety at detention centers requires the 
expertise of correctional officials, the Supreme Court, in Florence, gave 
too much discretion to detention center administrators to develop 
search policies, and the Court improperly balanced the need for the 
strip searches against detainees’ privacy interests.6  As a result of its 
unlimited deference to the judgment of correctional institution ad-
ministrators, the Court disregarded the importance of a reasonable 
suspicion standard for conducting such intrusive searches.7  The Su-
preme Court should have limited institutional discretion in determin-
                                                        
Copyright © 2013 by Nina Gleibermann. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author wishes to thank Professors Michael Millemann and Lee Kovarsky for their invalua-
ble feedback throughout the development of this Note.  She also thanks her editors, 
Thomas Kolkin, Shari Silver, and Christine White, for their insightful comments and ad-
vice.  Finally, the author is grateful to her friends and family, especially her mother Haleh 
Gleiberman, for their support and encouragement throughout law school. 
 1.  132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) [hereinafter Florence III]. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment protects people from “unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”  Id. 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fourth 
Amendment into the Due Process Clause, rendering the Fourth Amendment enforceable 
against states.  See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Amendment, 21 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 257 (1984) (noting that in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Su-
preme Court “ruled that substantive [F]ourth [A]mendment law, by ‘incorporation’ into 
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, applied with full force to state law enforcement authori-
ties”). 
 4.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1513–14. 
 5.  Id. at 1523. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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ing intake procedures, specifically strip searches performed on indi-
viduals arrested for minor offenses prior to their admittance to the 
jail’s general population.8  These limitations should reflect recom-
mended policies of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), which in-
corporate a reasonable suspicion standard for conducting strip 
searches on people who have committed minor crimes, such as the 
detainee in Florence.9 
I.  THE CASE 
On March 3, 2005, Albert Florence, his wife, and his son were 
traveling on Interstate Highway 295 in Burlington County, New Jersey, 
when a state trooper stopped their vehicle for a traffic infraction.10  
Florence’s wife was driving, but Florence identified himself as the 
owner of the vehicle.11  After the trooper conducted a records search, 
he discovered that Florence was the subject of an outstanding bench 
warrant in Essex County, New Jersey.12  The warrant was issued on 
April 25, 2003, and charged Florence with a form of civil contempt (a 
non-indictable offense) for failure to pay a fine.13  Florence informed 
the trooper that the warrant was invalid because he had already paid 
the fine.14  Additionally, Florence presented the trooper with a copy of 
a letter confirming that the fine had been paid.15  Nonetheless the 
                                                        
 8.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 10.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 
496 (D.N.J. 2009) [hereinafter Florence I], rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 11.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 
2011 WL 220710. 
 12.  Id.  Seven years prior to this incident, Florence was arrested after fleeing from po-
lice, and he was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon.  He en-
tered a guilty plea to a lesser offense and was sentenced to pay a fine on a monthly basis.  
Invasive Strip Search Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment, MCQUILLIN MUN. LAW REP. May 
2012, at 1. 
 13.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.  Florence fell behind on the sentence payments 
and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing. Invasive Strip Search Does Not Violate Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 12.  As a result, the bench warrant was issued in Essex County for 
his arrest.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496. 
 14.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496. 
 15.  After he was stopped, Florence offered the police officer proof of a certified letter 
from the State of New Jersey, dated October 2004, demonstrating that all judgments were 
satisfied and no warrant existed against him.  Complaint at ¶ 17, Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 
492 (D.N.J. 2009) (No. 05CV3619(JHR)), 2005 WL 2099622.  Petition for Writ of Certiora-
ri, supra note 11, at 3.  Florence kept the letter accessible because he had been pulled over 
in the past.  Id. 
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state trooper arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington Coun-
ty Detention Center (“Burlington jail”).16 
At the Burlington jail, Florence alleged that he was subjected to a 
full-body strip search.17  While Florence was nude, the officer con-
ducted a body cavity search by “directing [Florence] to . . . open his 
mouth, lift his tongue, hold his arms fully out, and lift his genitals.”18  
After the observation, Florence was instructed to shower.19  He was 
then detained at the Burlington jail for six days.20 
After the sixth day, Florence was transported to the Essex County 
jail (“Essex jail”).21  Upon arrival and pursuant to facility policy, Flor-
ence was again subjected to a full body and cavity strip search.22  The 
Essex jail officers required Florence and four other detainees to enter 
separate shower stalls, disrobe, and shower.23  The officers ordered 
the detainees to open their mouths and lift their genitals.24  Then the 
officers directed the detainees to turn around, squat, and cough.25  Af-
terwards, “Florence was placed with the general jail population.”26  
The next day, the officers transported Florence to the Essex County 
courthouse to appear before a judge.27  The judge dismissed all 
                                                        
 16.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 3–4.  The county had failed to re-
move the warrant from the relevant computer system, so the officer continued with the 
arrest.  Invasive Strip Search Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment, supra note 12. 
 17.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.  A strip search is “[a] search of a person con-
ducted after that person’s clothes have been removed, the purpose usu[ally] being to find 
any contraband the person might be hiding.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 18.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97.  The officer, sitting at arms-length in front of 
Florence, did not physically touch him during the strip search.  Id. at 497. 
 19.  Id.  According to officers at the Burlington Jail, visual observations of non-
indictable arrestees involve the nude arrestee taking a shower with a delousing agent.  See 
id. at 498–99 (explaining the intake procedures based on the testimony of several Burling-
ton Jail officers). 
 20.  Id. at 497.  During his imprisonment at the Burlington jail, Florence repeatedly 
told jail personnel that the warrant against him was invalid; however, the jail made no ef-
fort to inquire into the warrant’s validity.  See Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 20–24, 55. 
 21.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
 22.  Id.  The policy of the Essex County jail was that all arriving arrestees, regardless of 
the basis of their arrests, be strip searched while the officers observed and performed a full 
body examination “including body openings.”  Id. at 499.  Based on the Essex jail intake 
procedures, the strip search consisted of a visual observation, but not physical touching, by 
the officers.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 497. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 7.  New Jersey law generally re-
quires the county to present an arrestee to a magistrate judge for a probable cause hear-
ing, but Burlington County never provided Florence with such a hearing.  Id. at 5–6. 
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charges against Florence and ordered his immediate release from cus-
tody on grounds that the warrant was invalid.28 
Florence later filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 198329 
against the Burlington and Essex jails, as well as against several other 
people involved in the arrest and subsequent strip searches.30  Specifi-
cally, Florence alleged that the defendants violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights because the strip searches were unreasonable giv-
en the nature of Florence’s offense and the circumstances of his ar-
rest.31  Soon after the filing of the complaint, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey certified the lawsuit as a class 
action.32 
After three years of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of strip 
searches conducted without reasonable suspicion on non-indictable 
detainees.33  The federal district court adopted the majority view of 
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,34 and held that the blanket policy 
of strip searching non-indictable arrestees violated the Fourth 
                                                        
 28.  Id. at 7.  Florence had paid the fine less than a week after his failure to appear at 
the enforcement hearing.  Id. at 3. 
 29.  Section 1983 provides relief to individuals who have been deprived of their consti-
tutional rights by state actors.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under col-
or of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law . . . .”). 
 30.  Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 4–12. 
 31.  Id. at ¶¶ 39–45.  In Count Three of the Complaint, Florence alleged that he “was 
falsely arrested and subjected to the humiliation and degradation of a strip/body cavity 
search procedure prior to any determination . . . that the . . . detention was supported by 
probable cause.”  Id. at ¶ 40.  As such, Florence alleged that the searches were unconstitu-
tional because there was  no reasonable suspicion that he was concealing a weapon or con-
traband at the time of the searches.  Id. at ¶¶ 43–44. 
 32.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 05-3619, 2008 WL 800970, at *1 
(D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2008).  On Florence’s motion, the district court certified a class of indi-
viduals who had been charged with non-indictable offenses under New Jersey law and who 
were directed to undergo a strip search in the absence of reasonable suspicion while being 
processed at either the Burlington or Essex jails.  Id. at *17. 
 33.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495–96 (D.N.J. 2009).  Additionally, the plaintiffs 
sought injunctive relief on behalf of the class.  Id. at 496. The defendants, in turn, also 
sought Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity for certain defendants in 
their individual capacities, as well as the dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 Municipality Custom 
Violations Claim.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 505–11.  The district court recognized that an eight-to-three circuit split had 
developed since the Bell decision.  Id. at 505–07.  Three circuits—the Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits—split from the majority view that reasonable suspicion must be present 
before a strip search is conducted in the context of admitting new inmates.  See infra Part 
II.B.2. 
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Amendment.35  First, the district court reasoned that the intake pro-
cedures at the Burlington and Essex jails were intrusive enough to rise 
to the level of a “strip search.”36  Second, the court found that the 
search procedures were unconstitutional under the Bell v. Wolfish37 
balancing test.38  Thus, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that the Fourth Amendment forbids 
a suspicionless strip search of an individual arrested for a minor of-
fense if neither the nature nor the circumstances of the offense create 
a reasonable suspicion of the presence of contraband.39 
The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court 
decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.40  The 
Third Circuit only reviewed “‘whether a blanket policy of strip search-
ing all non-indictable arrestees admitted to a jail facility without first 
articulating reasonable suspicion violate[d] the Fourth Amend-
ment.’”41  In its analysis, the court recognized the existence of a circuit 
split as to whether non-indictable arrestees pose a security risk at the 
time of intake.42 
In applying the four-prong balancing test from Bell, the Third 
Circuit determined that “the scope, manner, and place of the [strip] 
searches” conducted by defendants “[w]ere similar to or less intrusive 
than those in Bell.”43  Furthermore, the court concluded that preven-
                                                        
 35.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
 36.  Id. at 502–03.  The Burlington County policy made a distinction between “visual 
observation” and “strip search,” whereas the Essex County policy did not.  Id. 
 37.  441 U.S. 520 (1979).  In Bell, the Supreme Court applied a four-prong balancing 
test to determine whether the need for visual body-cavity inspections on detainees after 
contact visits with outsiders outweighed the invasion of detainee’s personal rights.  See infra 
note 61 and accompanying text. 
 38.  Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 511.  The district court in Florence looked at the scope, 
manner, place, and justification for the particular intrusions.  Id. at 511–12.  The court 
reasoned that the strip procedures at both the Burlington and Essex jails invaded the per-
sonal privacy of the detainees.  Id.  Further, the searches took place in a shower room 
where privacy was minimal.  Id.  Third, the manner in which the searches were conducted 
was humiliating and degrading because they were conducted in the presence of other in-
mates.  Id.  Lastly, the district court found that the general security concerns justifying the 
strip search policies were not enough to outweigh the invasion of privacy interests.  Id. at 
512–13.  This Note refers interchangeably to the Bell test, the Bell balancing test, and the 
Bell factors. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2010) [herein-
after Florence II].  Following the district court decision, the defendants moved the district 
court to certify its summary judgment decision into an appealable order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Id.  
 41.  Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 42.  Id. at 303–06; see also supra note 34. 
 43.  Florence II, 621 F.3d at 307 (emphasis added); see also supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text. 
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tion of smuggling dangerous weapons and contraband into the cor-
rectional facility was a sufficient justification for a blanket strip search 
policy.44  A divided panel of the Third Circuit ultimately reversed the 
decision of the district court, holding that the search procedures 
conducted by defendants struck a reasonable balance between inmate 
privacy and the security needs of the Burlington and Essex jails.45 
Writing in dissent, Judge Pollak concluded that it is unreasonable 
for correctional officers to conduct intrusive strip searches of citizens 
“‘arrested for minor offenses, such as violating a leash law or a traffic 
code, [when the citizens] pose no credible risk for smuggling contra-
band into [a] jail’” and when there is no evidence demonstrating that 
non-indictable arrestees tend to possess contraband.46  Judge Pollak 
noted that jail administrators should be afforded deference in their 
attempts to ensure security in jails, but he also emphasized that con-
victed prisoners still receive constitutional protections, such as the 
“protection against forced nakedness during strip searches in front of 
others.”47 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split 
regarding “whether the Fourth Amendment requires correctional of-
ficials to exempt some detainees,” such as those arrested for minor, 
non-indictable crimes, from suspicionless strip search procedures be-
fore the detainees are placed in the general jail population.48 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need to defer 
to the judgment of the administrators of correctional institutions in 
developing jail policies since the late 1970s, there has been a reduc-
tion in the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to inmates.  Part 
II.A of this Note examines the evolution of the constitutional rights of 
detainees and the balancing test the Supreme Court developed to de-
termine the reasonableness of search procedures.  Part II.B illustrates 
                                                        
 44.  Florence II, 621 F.3d at 307–08. 
 45.  Id.  Although the majority recognized that the defendants had not presented any 
evidence regarding the discovery of contraband on indictable and non-indictable offend-
ers at the time of intake, the majority was still compelled by the decision in Bell.  The court 
noted that it is “plausible that incarcerated persons will induce or recruit others to subject 
themselves to arrest on non-indictable offenses to smuggle weapons or other contraband 
into the facility.”  Id. at 308. 
 46.  Florence II, 621 F.3d at 311–12 (Pollak, J., dissenting) (quoting Bull v. City and 
Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 47.  Id. at 312 (quoting Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (Bar-
kett, J., dissenting)). 
 48.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515 (2012).  
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how federal circuit courts have developed varying interpretations of 
what satisfies the reasonableness test for detainee search procedures 
and how these variations have resulted in a circuit split. 
A.  The Evolution of Inmates’ Constitutional Rights Has Limited the 
Scope of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Protections by 
Expanding the Scope of Constitutional Searches and Other Prison 
Regulations 
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable 
searches.49  The importance of maintaining safety in correctional in-
stitutions, however, restricts the extent to which constitutional rights 
are afforded to detainees.50  Courts defer to the judgment of correc-
tional officials when determining whether a policy satisfies constitu-
tional requirements.51 
1.  The Limited Scope of Fourth Amendment Protections 
Although the Fourth Amendment protects people from unrea-
sonable searches, the scope of the constitutional protection is not un-
limited.  Generally, probable cause must exist before a search warrant 
is issued, and police must secure a warrant before conducting a 
search.52  The Supreme Court has, however, established exceptions to 
this rule.  For instance, in Terry v. Ohio,53 the Court upheld warrantless 
“stop and frisk” procedures as reasonable when based on “specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
these facts reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.”54  The Terry decision 
divided the reasonableness determination into two parts.  The Court 
balanced the interests of the government in conducting the stop and 
frisk against “the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual 
rights.”55  In addition, the Court required individualized suspicion, in 
the form of specific and articulable facts, to justify the procedure.56  
                                                        
 49.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 51.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 52.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[T]he police must whenever practica-
ble, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant proce-
dure . . . .”). 
 53.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 54.  Id. at 12, 20–21. 
 55.  See id. at 22–25 (discussing whether officers are justified in performing a limited 
search of an individual’s outer clothing for weapons when there is no probable cause for 
arrest). 
 56.  Id. at 21.  The specific and articulable facts requirement is also referred to as “rea-
sonable suspicion.”  See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 71 n.20 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
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The Terry court implied that without an articulable, individualized 
suspicion that justifies the intrusion and is subject to review, the 
Fourth Amendment protection is meaningless.57  The Supreme Court 
has since extended the reach of exceptions to the warrant require-
ment to arrestees, justifying the constitutionality of warrantless 
searches based on the need to protect officers from the risks of harm 
they face while performing their duties.58 
The need to maintain safety and order at correctional institu-
tions has limited the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to pre-
trial detainees.  In Bell, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the 
rights of pretrial detainees when they are subjected to strip searches 
during the period of confinement prior to trial.59  In Bell, inmates 
challenged the correctional center’s policy requiring them “to expose 
their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search con-
ducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institu-
tion.”60  To determine the reasonableness of the cavity searches, the 
Supreme Court balanced “the need for the particular search against 
the invasion of personal rights that the search entail[ed] in a four-
factor balancing test.”61  The Court concluded that the need to pre-
vent weapons, drugs, and other prohibited items from being smug-
gled into the correctional center outweighed the resulting invasion of 
the inmates’ personal rights.”62  Although the Bell Court acknowl-
edged that convicted prisoners retain constitutional rights,63 the 
Court also pointed out that legitimate governmental interests can sub-
                                                        
curring in the result) (explaining that the Terry decision permits stop and frisks “premised 
on reasonable suspicion and does not require probable cause”). 
 57.  Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes mean-
ingful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforc-
ing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must 
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular cir-
cumstances.”). 
 58.  See, e.g., United States. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that in the 
case of a lawful custodial arrest, a warrantless search of the arrestee is reasonable to detect 
weapons on the suspect’s person); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (noting 
that incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the area within the immediate reach 
of the arrestee is reasonable to prevent the arrestee from obtaining or concealing a weap-
on). 
 59.  441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979). 
 60.  Id. at 558. 
 61.  Id. at 559.  The Court considered four factors to determine reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the manner in 
which the intrusion is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating the intrusion, and (4) 
the place of the intrusion.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 558–60. 
 63.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 545 (“[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional pro-
tections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.”). 
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ject “these rights . . . to restrictions and limitations.”64  Thus, the Court 
in Bell held that the blanket cavity strip search policy was constitution-
al, even when the searches were conducted on less than probable 
cause, because they were reasonably related to legitimate governmen-
tal interests.65 
2.  The Post-Bell Progeny—Expanding the Definition of “Reasonable” 
for Other Prison Regulations and Policies 
The Supreme Court applied the four-factor balancing test from 
Bell in subsequent cases challenging the constitutionality of strip 
searches on detainees.  Because of the challenges administrators face 
in operating detention centers, the Court has determined that a simi-
lar, less exacting standard is appropriate for determining the constitu-
tionality of other regulations and policies.  For example, in Block v. 
Rutherford,66 pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles County Central Jail 
challenged two of the jail’s policies—denying contact visits with out-
siders and conducting random searches of cells in the absence of the 
cell’s occupants.67  Applying the Bell factors, the Court was “unwilling 
to substitute [its own] judgment on these difficult and sensitive mat-
ters of institutional administration.”68  The Court held that the blan-
ket search policy and prohibition on contact visits were reasonable re-
sponses by jail officials to “legitimate security concerns.”69 
Similarly, in Turner v. Safley,70 the Supreme Court used a reasona-
ble relationship standard for prison regulations “to determine the 
constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division 
of Corrections relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate 
mail correspondence.71  The Turner Court sought “to formulate a 
standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is respon-
                                                        
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 560. 
 66.  468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
 67.  Id. at 578–79.  The pretrial detainees filed a class action lawsuit against the county 
jail officials, and the district court held that the policies violated the detainees’ rights un-
der the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 578–79, 590. 
 68.  Id. at 585, 588, 591. 
 69.  Id. at 588–89, 591.  Although the lower courts concluded that the blanket prohibi-
tion on contact visits was excessive in relation to the jail’s security interests, the Supreme 
Court noted the difficulties involved in “selectively allowing contact visits to some.”  Id. at 
587–88. 
 70.  482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 71.  See id. at 89 (“[S]everal factors are relevant in determining the reasonableness of 
the regulation at issue[, including that] there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ be-
tween the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify 
it.” (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 586)). 
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sive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner com-
plaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.’”72  Analyz-
ing case precedent,73 the Court observed that “[i]n none of these [re-
cent] ‘prisoners’ rights’ cases did the Court apply a standard of 
heightened scrutiny.”74  The Court then noted that the proper inquiry 
was instead “whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental 
rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological objectives, or 
whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those concerns.”75  
Applying the lesser “reasonably related” standard, the Court conclud-
ed that “[t]he prohibition on correspondence between institutions” 
was constitutional because it “[w]as logically connected to . . . legiti-
mate security concerns.”76 
In Bell and subsequent cases challenging the constitutionality of 
search policies and other prison regulations, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that courts should defer to the judgment of correctional of-
ficials when deciding whether a policy is reasonably related to legiti-
                                                        
 72.  Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 
(1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)).  In Turner, the lower 
courts applied a “strict scrutiny standard” to evaluate the constitutionality of the corre-
spondence and marriage regulations.  Id. at 83.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that the regulations failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard because 
they “w[ere] not the least restrictive means of achieving the asserted goals of rehabilitation 
and security.”  Id. (quoting Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1315, (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 788 (1987)). 
 73.  The Turner Court analyzed four cases involving prisoners’ rights: Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (constitutional challenges to several prison policies, including the 
prohibition on receiving food and personal care packages from outside sources, mandat-
ing body-cavity searches of detainees after contact visits, and the requirement that detain-
ees remain outside their cells during routine inspections); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Un-
ion, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (constitutional challenges to regulations prohibiting prisoner 
union meetings and bulk union mailing from outside sources); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817 (1974) (constitutional challenge to a prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face media 
interviews with individual inmates); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (constitu-
tional challenge to prisoner mail censorship regulations), overruled by Thornburgh v. Ab-
bott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
 74.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 87. 
 75.  Id.  The Court determined that a less exacting standard of review applied in the 
context of the constitutionality of prison regulations because of the deference afforded to 
prison administrators in creating and implementing operational policies.  See id. at 89 
(“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, regulation is val-
id if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: such a standard is necessary 
if ‘prison administrators . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments con-
cerning institutional operations.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 128)). 
 76.  Id. at 91.  In addition, the Turner Court “f[ou]nd that the marriage restriction, 
however, d[id] not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard, but rather constitute[d] an 
exaggerated response to petitioners’ rehabilitation and security concerns.”  Id.  
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mate security interests.77  For example, the Supreme Court has ob-
served that the practice of conducting random searches is an effective 
tool that correctional facilities use to deter the possession of contra-
band.  In Hudson v. Palmer,78 the Court upheld a policy of random 
searches of inmate lockers and cells without reasonable suspicion 
based on the argument that a general search protocol would under-
mine the security of the institution.79  As a result, when it comes to 
searches of inmates and arrestees, courts often defer to prison admin-
istrators.80 
B.  Circuit Courts Disagree on Whether Reasonable Suspicion Is Required 
for Strip Searches to be Constitutional Under the Fourth Amendment 
Bell was one of the first Supreme Court cases to address the con-
stitutional rights of pretrial detainees.81  Despite the four-factor rea-
sonableness test that the Court announced in Bell, federal circuit 
courts have varied in their interpretations of Bell and in their applica-
tions of the balancing test.82 
                                                        
 77.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their 
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institu-
tional security.”); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S., 576, 583–91 (1984) (relying on Bell 
and deferring to the judgment of prison authorities); Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (“[C]ourts 
should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections 
officials . . . .’” (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 827)). 
 78.  468 U.S. 517 (1984).  The inmate in Hudson claimed that a prison guard deprived 
him of his right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment when the 
guard destroyed his property during a “shakedown search” of the prison locker.  Id. at 530.  
The inmate brought a separate claim alleging that the shakedown search was an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the Court “conclude[d] that 
prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.”  Id. at 30. 
 79.  Id. at 529 (“‘For one to advocate that prison searches must be conducted only pur-
suant to an enunciated general policy or when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate 
is to ignore the realities of prison operation.’” (quoting Marreo v. Commonwealth, 284 
S.E.2d 809, 811 (Va. 1981))). 
 80.  See, e.g., Bull v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e 
conclude that San Francisco’s policy requiring strip searches of all arrestees classified for 
custodial housing in the general population was facially reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, notwithstanding the lack of individualized reasonable suspicion as to the in-
dividuals searched.”); see also infra Part II.B.1. 
 81.  Cf. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523 (“Over the past five terms, this Court has in several deci-
sions considered constitutional challenges to prison conditions or practices by convicted 
prisoners.  This case requires us to examine the constitutional rights of pretrial detain-
ees . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 82.  See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
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1.  Several Circuit Courts Have Upheld the Constitutionality of 
Blanket Strip Search Policies Under the Bell Test 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits have held that strip searches conducted on pretrial de-
tainees, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, are constitution-
al under the Fourth Amendment based on an application of the Bell 
test.  In Powell v. Barrett,83 the Eleventh Circuit held that a blanket vis-
ual strip search policy, which mandated searches on all detainees 
placed into the general jail population for the first time, did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.84  There, the five plaintiffs had been 
charged with minor offenses.85  The plaintiffs argued that “there was 
no reasonable suspicion to believe that any of them had hidden con-
traband.”86  Applying the Bell factors, the Eleventh Circuit noted that 
the security concerns used to justify strip searches of inmates after 
contact visits in Bell were no greater than those needed to justify visual 
strip searches of new detainees in Powell.87  The Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded thatthe blanket strip search policies did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, “provided that the searches are no more intrusive on 
privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case.”88 
The Ninth and Third Circuits soon followed the Eleventh Circuit 
decision.  In Bull v. City and County of San Francisco,89 the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the constitutionality of the San Francisco Sherriff’s Depart-
ment’s policy of strip searching all arrestees introduced into the gen-
eral jail population,90 overruling its own case precedent.91  Further-
                                                        
 83.  541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 84.  Id. at 1300. 
 85.  Id. at 1301.  The charges against the plaintiffs included the following minor of-
fenses: “a bail revocation on a disorderly conduct charge, a traffic ticket warrant, a DUI 
charge, . . . a contempt charge for failure to pay child support,” and a non-violent burglary 
charge.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See id. at 1314 (“[T]here are plenty of situations where arrestees have had at least 
as much opportunity to conceal contraband as would inmates on contact visits, which is 
the situation in Bell.”). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 90.  Id. at 982.  The Ninth Circuit determined that the scope, manner, and justification 
for the San Francisco policy was analogous to Bell, in which the balancing test favored the 
correctional institutions safety concerns.  Id. at 975.  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley required it to give greater deference 
to the jail officials’ determinations of what constituted reasonable search policies.  Id. at 
976–77. 
 91.  See, e.g., Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1445–48 (9th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that a blanket strip search policy of arrestees was per se unconstitutional), overruled by 
Bull v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 
614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984) (same), overruled by Bull, 595 F.3d 964.  The Ninth Circuit, in Bull, 
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more, in the appellate decision in Florence, the Third Circuit held that 
the blanket strip search policies implemented by the Burlington and 
Essex jails were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.92  Even 
more recently, the D.C. Circuit applied the Bell test in a decision that 
reversed the court’s denial of summary judgment to a former U.S. 
Marshal who strip searched arrested protestors upon processing them 
into holding cells.93  The D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 
searches on the grounds that in 2002, when the arrests and strip 
searches occurred, there “was no clearly established constitutional 
prohibition of strip searching arrestees without individualized, rea-
sonable suspicion.”94 
2.  Other Circuits Have Concluded That Blanket Strip Search Policies 
Are Unconstitutional When Conducted in the Absence of 
Reasonable Suspicion 
Other circuits have held that blanket strip search policies violate 
the Fourth Amendment when conducted in the absence of individual-
ized suspicion.  Under the Bell balancing test, the First and Seventh 
Circuits, for example, have found that the humiliating and dehuman-
izing invasiveness of strip searches outweighs correctional institutions’ 
needs for the search, especially when the alleged offense was minor.95 
In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,96 the Seventh Circuit held that 
Chicago’s policy of strip searching female misdemeanor offenders 
who were not inherently dangerous and who were detained only for a 
brief time was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.97  The court noted that Bell was inapplicable because the 
searches in Mary Beth G. were conducted under significantly different 
circumstances: The detainees in Bell “were awaiting trial on serious 
federal charges,” whereas the detainees in Mary Beth G. were arrested 
                                                        
concluded that previous case law failed to give appropriate weight to the Bell and Turner 
factors.  Bull, 595 F.3d at 977. 
 92.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–45. 
 93.  Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 94.  Id. at 388; see also id. at 386 (“The governing precedent was then [in 2002], as it is 
now, Bell v. Wolfish, and nothing in Bell requires individualized, reasonable suspicion be-
fore strip searching a person entering a detention facility.”). 
 95.  See generally Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108–13 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding 
that it was unconstitutional to strip search all pre-arraigned detainees charged with mis-
demeanors not associated with weapons or contraband, even though the detainees were 
held in a maximum security facility with documented history of contraband, and they also 
freely intermingled with the general prison population). 
 96.  723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 97.  Id. at 1273. 
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for misdemeanor offenses.98  As such, the “‘need for the particular 
search’” of the misdemeanants, especially in the absence of reasona-
ble suspicion of smuggled contraband, was not “substantial 
enough . . . to justify the severity of the governmental intrusion.”99 
In addition, the First Circuit has questioned correctional institu-
tions’ justifications for conducting strip searches.  For instance, in 
Roberts v. Rhode Island,100 the court noted that the security concerns of 
the intake facility did not justify its strip search procedures.101  Thus, 
the court determined that the search policies were unconstitutional.102  
At issue in Roberts were “[t]wo Rhode Island Department of Correc-
tions . . . policies provid[ing] that all males committed to the state 
prison be subject[ed] to a strip search and a visual body cavity 
search.”103  With the federal circuit courts clearly split on the constitu-
tionality of blanket strip searches, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Florence. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Florence, the Supreme Court held that the strip search proce-
dures at the Burlington and Essex Jails “struck a reasonable balance 
between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions” and there-
fore comported with the Fourth Amendment.104  The Court found 
that Florence failed to provide substantial evidence that the strip 
search policies enforced by the Burlington and Essex jails “[w]ere an 
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.”105 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy examined the “rules or 
limitations the Constitution imposes on searches of arrested persons” 
entering the jail population.106  The Court explained the reasons why 
“deference must be given to [correctional] officials in charge of” 
                                                        
 98.  Id. at 1272. 
 99.  Id. at 1272–73 (citation omitted). 
 100.  239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 101.  Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110–13.  The “‘justification for initiating’” the strip search was 
the concern for maintaining institutional security.  Id. at 110–11.  The institutional security 
concerns, however, were insufficient to support the invasive strip search that forced the 
detainee to display his genitals and spread his legs so officials could observe his body cavi-
ty.  Id. at 110.  Unlike the facility in Bell, the Rhode Island facility did not limit its searches 
to prisoners who had contact with outside visitors.  Id. at 111.  Further, prison officials had 
no reason to believe the detainee was highly dangerous or carrying weapons or contra-
band.  Id. at 112. 
 102.  Id. at 113. 
 103.  Id. at 108. 
 104.  132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012). 
 105.  Id. at 1513–14. 
 106.  Id. at 1513. 
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conducting searches as a part of the jail intake process.107  In particu-
lar, the Court noted that “[t]he admission of inmates creates numer-
ous risks for facility staff,” such as the introduction of contagious in-
fections108 and “grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang 
members who go through the intake process.”109  The Court also 
acknowledged the serious risks involved in the ability of new detainees 
to smuggle “[w]eapons, drugs, and alcohol” into jail.110  As such, the 
Supreme Court concluded that “there [is] a substantial interest” in 
performing strip searches at intake to “prevent[] any new inmate . . . 
from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater 
risk.”111 
The Supreme Court next explained that creating an exemption 
from strip searching certain detainees who had been arrested for mi-
nor offenses “would be unworkable.”112  The Court rejected Florence’s 
argument that “there is little benefit to conducting [such] invasive 
[searches] on a new detainee who has not been arrested for a serious 
crime or for any offense involving a weapon or drugs.”113  First, the 
Court emphasized that “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can 
turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.”114  As a re-
sult of such uncertainties, the Court observed, it is reasonable for cor-
rectional officials to “conduct the same thorough search of everyone 
who will be admitted to their facilities.”115  The Court also noted that 
some “people arrested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle pro-
hibited items into jail,” by using their body cavities as concealment.116  
Second, the Supreme Court discussed the issues involved in clas-
sifying and exempting certain detainees from standard strip search 
                                                        
 107.  Id. at 1518. 
 108.  Id. (discussing “[t]he danger of introducing lice or contagious infections” during 
the admission of inmates). 
 109.  Id. at 1518–19.  The Court observed that during the intake process, gang members 
may “recruit new inmates by force,” and that feuding gangs can engage in deadly fights, 
putting the officers at risk.  Id. at 1518–19.  The Court determined that “[t]hese considera-
tions . . . justify a visual inspection for certain tattoos and other signs of gang affiliation as 
part of the intake process.”  Id. at 1519. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 1520. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 114.  Id.  As an example, the Court noted that Timothy McVeigh, the man responsible 
for the Oklahoma City bombings, “was stopped by a state trooper [for] driving without a 
license plate” a short time after the bombing.  Id.  Similarly, one of the terrorists involved 
in the 9/11 terrorist attack “was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days” prior to 
the terrorist attacks.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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procedures based on the degree of their offenses.117  The Court ex-
plained that “[t]he officers who conduct an initial search often do not 
have access to criminal history records” of arrestees, and that the 
“records can be inaccurate or incomplete.”118  Additionally, the Court 
noted that it would be hard to implement exceptions for non-
indictable detainees because officers would be required to quickly de-
termine “whether any of the [arrestees’] underlying offenses were se-
rious enough to authorize invasive search protocol.”119  The Court 
predicted that officers may be less inclined to conduct a strip search 
when it is difficult to determine the severity of the underlying offense, 
which could result in unnecessary risks to the jail population.120  Thus, 
the Court concluded that exempting certain detainees from strip 
searches during intake, solely based on their having committed minor 
offenses, would increase the danger already present in detention facil-
ities.121 
Writing in separate concurring opinions, Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito agreed with the majority.122  However, they stressed 
that the Court “d[id] not foreclose the possibility of an exception to 
the rule” in the future; in other words, the Court should “not hold 
that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an ar-
restee.”123 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Gins-
burg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote that the Fourth Amendment for-
bids an officer from conducting a strip “search of an individual ar-
rested for a minor offense that does not involve drugs or violence,” 
when the officer does not “have reasonable suspicion to believe that 
the individual possesses drugs or contraband.”124  Justice Breyer ex-
plained that “the place, scope and manner” of the strip searches in 
Florence were “a serious invasion of privacy” because they “involve[d] 
close observation of the private areas of a person’s body.”125  The dis-
                                                        
 117.  Id. at 1521–22. 
 118.  Id. at 1521.  The Court pointed out that Florence’s criminal record did not in-
clude his previous arrest for possession of a deadly weapon.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 1521–22. 
 120.  Id. at 1522. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 123.  Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 124.  Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Id. at 1525–26 (“[T]he kind of strip search in question involves more than un-
dressing and taking a shower (even if guards monitor the shower area for threatened dis-
order).  Rather, the searches here involve close observation of the private areas of a per-
son’s body and for that reason constitute a far more serious invasion of that person’s 
privacy.”). 
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sent noted other instances in which individuals arrested for minor of-
fenses were subjected to a visual strip search to emphasize the degra-
dation and humiliation that can result from such an invasion of priva-
cy.126 
Although Justice Breyer acknowledged “that prison regulations 
that interfere with important constitutional interests are generally val-
id as long as they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological in-
terests,’” he concluded that the strip searches in Florence lacked such 
justification.127  Justice Breyer noted that the “first two penological in-
terests advanced” in favor of strip searches—“(1) to detect injuries or 
diseases [and] (2) to identify gang tattoos”—could be satisfied 
through other intake procedures.128  Further, the dissent noted that 
there was no justification for the third penological interest—“to de-
tect contraband”—due to “the small number of ‘incidents’” in which 
inmates have been discovered to have concealed contraband at the 
time of admission.129  Moreover, the dissent highlighted the laws in 
various states that prohibit suspicionless strip searches to demonstrate 
that the application of a reasonable suspicion standard does not “in-
terfer[e] with the legitimate penal interest in preventing the smug-
gling of contraband.”130  Overall, Justice Breyer found that case prece-
dent cited by the majority did not adequately justify the exercise of 
strip searches of detainees arrested for minor offenses in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion.131 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Florence, the Supreme Court held that correctional institutions 
may conduct suspicionless strip searches of every arrestee introduced 
into the general jail population, even when the arrestee allegedly 
committed a minor offense.132  The Court reasoned that the strip 
searches performed on Florence struck a reasonable balance between 
respecting his privacy rights and maintaining the security needs of the 
                                                        
 126.  Id. at 1526–27.  The dissent cited to instances involving the strip search of women 
who were lactating, menstruating, or had been sexually assaulted.  Id. at 1527. 
 127.  Id. at 1527 (citation omitted). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 1528. 
 130.  Id. at 1529–31. 
 131.  Id. at 1530–31.  The dissent noted that the majority did not “set forth any example 
of an instance in which contraband was smuggled into the general jail population during 
intake that could not have been discovered if the jail was employing a reasonable suspicion 
standard.”  Id. at 1530. 
 132.  Id. at 1523 (majority opinion). 
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Burlington and Essex jails.133  In so holding, however, the Court im-
properly analogized Florence’s case to Bell.134  The Florence Court also 
afforded too much discretion to jail officials in determining the rea-
sonableness of search procedures.135  Rather than provide nearly un-
limited discretion to correctional institutions, the Court should have 
applied the ABA standards, which adopt a reasonable suspicion 
standard for conducting strip searches.136 
A.  The Florence Court Improperly Interpreted the Bell Balancing Test 
in Determining the Reasonableness of Strip Searches of Detainees 
The Supreme Court improperly applied the Bell balancing test to 
the facts of Florence.  The Court’s reliance on Bell was misplaced be-
cause the circumstances in Florence were highly distinguishable from 
those in Bell.137  Proper application of the Bell balancing test to the 
facts of Florence demonstrates that the particular needs for the strip 
searches of Florence were heavily outweighed by the severe intrusion 
on his privacy rights.138 
1.  The Unique Facts of Florence Did Not Warrant Heavy Reliance 
on Bell as a Basis for the Supreme Court’s Decision 
The circumstances surrounding the strip searches in Florence were 
distinct from those in Bell and should have resulted in a different out-
come before the Supreme Court.  First, Florence, unlike the detain-
ees in Bell, was a new detainee to the facility when he was strip 
searched.139  In Bell, “the detainees were already confined” and were 
                                                        
 133.  See supra Part III. 
 134.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 135.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 136.  See infra Part IV.C.  Most states have adopted the ABA standards to determine the 
reasonableness of invasive strip searches.  There are other organizations that set out simi-
lar, if not identical, standards.  For example, the American Correctional Association has 
promulgated a standard that forbids strip searches of arrestees during intake in the ab-
sence of “reasonable belief or suspicion” of the possession of contraband.  CORE JAIL 
STANDARDS 1-CORE-2C-02, (Am. Corr. Ass’n 2010), available at 
www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc012203.pdf.  Similarly, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice has published standards, which include a section on detainee searches, 
that are designed for use in reviewing non-federal facilities that have federal detainees to 
ensure “these facilities . . . protect . . . constitutional rights.”  FEDERAL PERFORMANCE-
BASED DETENTION STANDARDS 1, 37 (Office of the Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/fpbds02232011.pdf.  
 137.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 138.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 139.  Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16, 
Florence II, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No 10-945), 2011 WL2578557. 
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“strip searched after contact visits” with outside visitors.140  The Bell 
Court noted that the strip searches were reasonable, in part, because 
the inmates posed “a greater risk to jail security and order.”141  In con-
trast, Florence had merely been arrested for a minor infraction and 
was strip searched upon being processed for entry into both the Bur-
lington and Essex jails.142  Florence was arrested shortly after his vehi-
cle was stopped; he had neither the opportunity nor the motive to 
smuggle contraband into the Burlington and Essex jails.143   
Second, the nature of Florence’s offense did not justify the inva-
sive strip searches implemented.  As Justice Breyer noted in dissent, 
“[p]rison regulations that interfere with important constitutional in-
terests are generally valid as long as they are ‘reasonably related to le-
gitimate penological interests,’” such as detecting contraband.144  In 
Bell, the Supreme Court noted that post-contact visit strip searches 
were reasonably related to “maintaining institutional security,” which 
justified searching “both convicted prisoners and pretrial detain-
ees.”145  The Court recognized that pretrial detainees were often 
“charged with serious crimes” or had prior criminal records, and thus 
posed security risks as great as those posed by convicted inmates.146 
The strip searches of Florence, however, were not reasonably re-
lated to legitimate penological interests because Florence’s offense 
did not involve violence or drugs.147  The dissenting opinion in Florence 
                                                        
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 & n.28 (1979).  In Bell, there was a concern that 
inmates would try to smuggle contraband received from outside visitors.  Id. at 558–59.  In 
addition, the Court suggested that it was reasonable to conduct strip searches on all de-
tainees, including “those who are detained prior to trial,” because they are often “charged 
with serious crimes or . . . have prior records” and therefore “may pose a greater risk of 
escape that convicted inmates.”  Id. at 546 n.28. 
 142.  See supra Part I. 
 143.  Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 139, at 16 (“[D]etainees like Mr. Florence, who are accused of minor offenses, are 
unlikely to have the motive or opportunity to plan to be arrested with contraband hidden 
on their persons for the purpose of smuggling it into a prison.”). 
 144.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527–28 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). 
 145.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 & n.28 (noting that there “[w]as no basis for concluding 
that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates”); see also supra 
note 141 and accompanying text. 
 146.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 & n.28; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 147.  See Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1530–32 (discussing state laws and federal appellate 
court decisions that forbid strip searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the 
arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband).  In this instance, Florence was arrested for 
a minor traffic offense, which did not give the state trooper any reason to believe he was 
violent or carrying a concealed weapon or drugs.  See supra note 143 and accompanying 
text. 
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correctly noted that the Bell Court, in implementing a post-contact-
visit blanket strip search policy, “had no occasion to focus upon those 
arrested for minor crimes, prior to a judicial officer’s determination 
that [the detainee] should be committed to prison.”148  Florence, 
however, was not presented to a magistrate judge, even though one 
was available, until a week after his detainment.149  Florence was un-
fairly detained without having received determination from a judicial 
officer that was required to commit Florence to prison.  Overall, the 
circumstances of Florence’s case were very different from those in Bell 
and did not warrant the strip searches.  Thus, Bell did not provide suf-
ficient justification for the Florence majority’s proposition that the 
judgment of correctional officers is enough to implement an invasive 
strip search policy without reasonable suspicion.150 
2.  The Asserted Needs for the Strip Searches in Florence Did Not 
Outweigh the Invasion of Personal Privacy Rights 
In its application of the Bell balancing test, the Florence majority 
incorrectly concluded that the asserted need for the two strip searches 
outweighed the invasion of Florence’s personal rights.151  To comply 
with the Fourth Amendment, searches must be reasonable in scope 
and in intrusiveness.152  In past cases, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the humiliating and dehumanizing nature of strip searches sim-
ilar to those performed on Florence.153  In addition, federal appellate 
courts have described strip search practices as “‘demeaning, dehu-
manizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrass-
ing, [and] repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.’”154  The 
invasive and degrading nature of these strip searches must be bal-
                                                        
 148.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1531. 
 149.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 150.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1531–32. 
 151.  See supra Part III. 
 152.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amend-
ment is not capable of precise definition . . . it requires a balancing of the need for the 
particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”); see also 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth Amend-
ment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental inva-
sion of a citizen’s personal security.”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) 
(“The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place 
a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”); 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (“We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches may 
invade the personal privacy of inmates.”). 
 154.  Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). 
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anced carefully with the actual security risks used to justify each search 
to uphold the constitutionality of the procedures.155 
In the absence of a reasonable suspicion standard, the strip 
search of Florence did not outweigh the severe invasion of his privacy 
rights.  First, the purported need for a strip search—especially on two 
different occasions—was unreasonable when weighed against the ac-
tual security risks Florence posed.  The Bell Court noted that it was 
reasonable for jail officials to be suspicious of detainees who had con-
tact with outside visitors;156 thus, there was a substantial basis for the 
decision to strip search all detainees who voluntarily chose to meet 
with visitors.157  Neither the Florence majority nor the dissent dismissed 
the difficulties in managing a correctional institution and the need to 
minimize the spread of disease and violence.158  Yet, the dissent cor-
rectly determined that there was a lack of evidence to support strip 
searches of those arrested for minor offenses based on the need to 
preserve and maintain prison security.159  For example, alternative 
methods were available to search Florence and assure that he would 
                                                        
 155.  Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 139, at 7–8 (emphasis added). 
 156.  See supra Part II.A.1.  Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell, the dissent 
in Bull v. City of San Francisco noted that “[a]s a matter of common sense, contact visits are 
far more likely to lead to smuggling than initial arrests.”  595 F.3d 964, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 157.  In contrast, individuals like Florence typically do not know that they are about to 
be arrested and, thus, have even less of an opportunity to hide contraband.  See Shain v. 
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Unlike persons already in jail who receive contact 
visits, arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested and thus an 
opportunity to hide something.”).  As the dissenting judge in the Third Circuit opinion in 
Florence noted, “[o]ne might doubt that individuals would deliberately commit minor of-
fenses such as civil contempt . . . and then secrete contraband on their person, all in the 
hope that they will, at some future moment, be arrested and taken to jail to make their 
illicit deliveries.”  Florence II, 621 F.3d, 296, 312 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (Pollack, J., dissenting). 
 158.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527–28 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
1520 (majority opinion). 
 159.  Id. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The dissent focused on the lack of a justifica-
tion for strip searches with respect to detecting contraband.  The dissent cited to “a study 
of 23,000 persons admitted to the Orange County correctional facility [in New York] be-
tween 1999 and 2003.”  Id.  According to the study, of the “23,000 persons [who] under-
went a strip search of the kind described” in Florence, “the County encountered three inci-
dents of drugs recovered from an inmate’s anal cavity and two incidents of drugs falling 
from an inmate’s underwear.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Justice Breyer noted that the results 
of the study revealed “that in four of these five instances there may have been reasonable 
suspicion to search, leaving only one instance in 23,000 in which the strip search policy 
‘arguably’ detected additional contraband” in the absence of reasonable suspicion.  Id. 
(citing Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 69–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
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pose no security risks prior to admission into the general jail popula-
tion.160 
Furthermore, the invasion of Florence’s privacy happened on two 
separate occasions—at the Burlington jail and then again upon trans-
fer to the Essex jail.161  Florence was strip searched upon entering the 
Burlington jail to ensure that he would not pose a threat to the gen-
eral jail population and then was detained there for six days.  There 
was very little evidence provided as to why it was necessary for him to 
undergo a second strip search upon transfer to the Essex jail.  If rea-
sonable suspicion was the standard implemented at the time Florence 
arrived at the Essex jail, it is unlikely that correctional officials would 
have performed a second strip search.162  Thus, the invasive and de-
grading nature of the two strip searches clearly outweighed the mini-
mal security risks offered to justify the search of Florence on either 
occasion. 
B.  By Not Implementing a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, the Florence 
Court Afforded Almost Unlimited Discretion to Correctional Facilities 
at the Expense of Detainees’ Constitutional Rights 
In Florence, the Supreme Court granted correctional facilities 
nearly unlimited power to create and implement regulations.  Alt-
hough the Court’s decision resolved a significant circuit split, the de-
cision will likely lead to abuse in the correctional system.  In the past, 
“[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly granted considerable deference 
to corrections officials in reviewing of jail administration policies.”163  
In the absence of a reasonable suspicion standard for strip searches, 
however, such searches are conducted in an indiscriminate manner, 
not only in the context of detainees searched during intake proce-
dures at correctional institutions, but also in the context of school 
searches and gender-based searches.164  In addition, the Supreme 
                                                        
 160.  As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, “searches already employed at Essex and 
Burlington include[d]: (a) pat-frisking all inmates; (b) making inmates go through metal 
detectors . . .; (c) making inmates shower and use particular delousing agents or bathing 
supplies; and (d) searching inmates’ clothing.”  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1528. 
 161.  See supra text accompanying notes 17–28. 
 162.  See supra text accompanying notes 159–160; see also Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1528–
32 (discussing the lack of justification for the strip searches of Florence pointing to the 
reasonable suspicion standard recommended by professional bodies and implemented in 
many states). 
 163.  See generally The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 206, 
211–12 (2012) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1975)). 
 164.  See generally Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (con-
sidering the constitutionality of a strip search performed by school officials on an eighth 
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Court’s practice of deferring to correctional officials has been overly 
broad and poorly defined, causing confusion among lower courts and 
resulting in a circuit split.165 
Even though the Court’s decision may increase the effectiveness 
of safety procedures at correctional facilities, the Florence decision will 
ultimately result in the erosion of constitutional protections afforded 
to detainees.  One of “[t]he most remarkable aspect[s] of the [Flor-
ence] ruling was the Court’s [heavy] reliance on the expertise of cor-
rections officials, without any scrutiny of their [judgment] in develop-
ing a prison’s strip search policy.”166  With unlimited deference, 
correctional facilities are likely to implement “more invasive policies, 
which will decrease the incentive for prisoners to bring . . . constitu-
tional challenges” to their treatment.167  The post-Bell cases focused on 
whether detainees have any privacy rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and the Supreme Court has strictly limited the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment as it applies in correctional facilities.168  In Hud-
son, Justice Stevens in a concurring and a dissenting opinion, argued 
that the Court’s policy of deference encouraged it to “overlook[] the 
purpose of a written Constitution.”169  The Court’s decision in Florence 
abrogated the reasonable suspicion standard for conducting strip 
searches, thus turning a blind eye to the Fourth Amendment rights of 
detainees. 
                                                        
grader suspected of selling painkillers); Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 
1984) (detailing the Chicago policy of strip searching female arrestees while only hand 
frisking male arrestees). 
 165.  The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 163, at 212–13.  Giving un-
limited deference to jail officials fails to provide lower federal courts with guidance in cas-
es similar to Florence.  Such an “‘open-ended’ standard allows courts to decide cases based 
only on their policy preferences and also result[s] in circuit splits on policies and doc-
trine.”  Id. at 213. 
 166.  Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
 167.  Id. at 213. 
 168.  See Loui Itoh, Note, “Hands-off” the Solicitor General: Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders and the Supreme Court’s Deference in Prison Cases, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 251, 263 
& n.82 (2012) (citing Deborah L. MacGregor, Note, Stripped of All Reasons?  The Appropriate 
Standard for Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 
36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 174 (2003)). 
 169.  See 468 U.S. 517, 556–57 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The Court’s conclusive presumption that all conduct by prison guards is reasona-
ble is . . . a decision to sacrifice constitutional principle to the Court’s own assessment of 
administrative expediency.”); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am concerned about the Court’s apparent 
willingness to substitute the rhetoric of judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny of con-
stitutional claims in the prison setting.”). 
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C.  The ABA’s Reasonable Suspicion Standard Provides Better Fourth 
Amendment Protection for Pretrial Detainees 
The ABA’s reasonable suspicion standard provides more protec-
tion of pretrial detainees’ constitutional rights than does the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Florence regarding blanket strip search policies.170  
Every year approximately 13,000,000 Americans are arrested—roughly 
700,000 for minor offenses.171  A blanket strip search policy assumes 
that all arrestees, regardless of the basis for arrest, may possess and 
smuggle contraband.172  This policy defeats the purpose of having le-
gitimate penological needs for policies implemented by correctional 
institutions. 
Rather than approve a blanket strip search policy, the Supreme 
Court should have implemented a reasonable, individualized suspi-
cion standard to strike an effective balance between a detainee’s pri-
vacy rights and prison security concerns.173  Reasonable suspicion is a 
relatively low standard, so it is highly unlikely that such a standard 
would hinder the security efforts of correctional facilities.174  At the 
same time, the standard would provide at least some protection for 
the privacy interests at stake for individuals arrested for minor offens-
es. 
The Supreme Court should have incorporated ABA Standard 23-
7.9175 concerning “searches of prisoners’ bodies,” which carefully bal-
ances detainee privacy rights with the security needs of correctional 
                                                        
 170.  See Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, su-
pra note 139, at 15–17 (explaining that the reasonable suspicion standard preserves the 
constitutional requirement that searches under the Fourth Amendment be reasonable). 
 171.  PBS NewsHour: Supreme Court Upholds Inmate Strip Searches Regardless of Charges (PBS 
television broadcast Apr. 2, 2012), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb 
/law/jan-june12/scotus_04-02.html. 
 172.  See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 173.  See Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, su-
pra note 139, at 4–11 (discussing how “[t]he ABA standard on strip searches strikes the 
proper balance between personal rights and prison security”). 
 174.  Reasonable suspicion requires only “‘a minimal level of objective justification’” 
and that an “officer . . . be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch’” that the detainee has contraband.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
123–24 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 175.  STANDARDS ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-7.9 (2011).  ABA Standard 23-
7.9(d) specifically addresses strip searches of prisoners.  The term “‘prisoner’ means any 
person incarcerated in a correctional facility,” including jails and prisons.  STANDARDS ON 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-1.0(i)–(k).  A “‘jail’ means a correctional facility holding 
primarily pretrial detainees and . . . prisoners sentenced to a term of one year or less.”  Id. 
§ 23-1.0(i). 
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facilities.176  The American Bar Association Standard 23-7.9(d) pro-
vides that individuals arrested and detained for minor, nonviolent, 
non-drug-related offenses should be strip searched only when there is 
“individualized reasonable suspicion” that the prisoner is carrying 
contraband.177  Several jurisdictions have implemented statutes that 
mimic the ABA strip search policy.178  The Federal Bureau of Prisons 
and numerous states impose an individualized suspicion standard 
whenever a minor offense is involved.179  In addition, some jurisdictions 
require the individualized suspicion standard for strip searches con-
ducted on individuals arrested for any crime, regardless of whether 
the crime was considered “minor.”180  Ultimately, “ABA Standard 23-
7.9(d) sets out a practical, workable alternative to permitting a strip 
search of anyone placed in a detention facility, regardless of the in-
fraction alleged.”181 
In Florence, Justice Breyer’s dissent made an even more convinc-
ing and logical case for applying a reasonable suspicion standard to 
strip searches performed on detainees who have committed minor 
crimes.182  The act of being strip searched is humiliating,183 especially 
                                                        
 176.  Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 139, at 4. 
 177.  The relevant text of ABA Standard 23-7.9(d) reads as follows: 
Visual searches of prisoner’s bodily areas . . . should . . . be permitted only upon 
individualized suspicion that the prisoner is carrying contraband, unless the 
prisoner has recently had an opportunity to obtain contraband, as upon admis-
sion to the facility . . . upon return from outside the facility, after a contact visit, 
or when the prisoner has otherwise had contact with a member of the general 
public; provided that a strip search should not be permitted without individual-
ized reasonable suspicion when the prisoner is an arrestee charged with a minor 
offense not involving drugs or violence and the proposed strip search is upon 
the prisoner’s admission to a correctional facility or before the prisoners place-
ment in a housing unit. 
Id. § 23-7.9(d)(ii). 
 178.  See Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, su-
pra note 139, at 12–14.  For example, under the California Penal Code: 
No person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor or infraction offense, 
except those involving weapons, controlled substances or violence . . . shall be 
subjected to a strip search or visual body cavity search prior to placement in the 
general jail population, unless a peace officer has determined there is reasonable 
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe such person is con-
cealing a weapon or contraband, and a strip search will result in the discovery of 
the weapon or contraband. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4030(f) (West 2012). 
 179.  Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 139, at 13. 
 180.  Id. at 14. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  See supra text accompanying notes 124–131. 
 183.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 106 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [Vol. 72:81 
when the offense that led to the strip search was minor, such as driv-
ing with a noisy muffler or failing to wear a seatbelt.184  The Florence 
Court was more focused on appeasing the interests of the govern-
ment185 than on maintaining a balance between security in correc-
tional facilities and the privacy rights of individuals. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board of Freeholders 
approved a blanket policy that allows strip searches to be conducted 
on all arrestees, even on those arrested for the most mundane offens-
es.186  At least seven federal appellate courts agreed with Florence’s 
argument that the U.S. Constitution prohibits strip searches of people 
arrested for minor offense charges in the absence of reasonable suspi-
cion.187  Yet, the Supreme Court focused more on the difficulties of 
maintaining safety at correctional institutions and granted nearly un-
limited deference to the judgment of correctional officials in deter-
mining strip search policies.188  The Court’s decision in Florence im-
plies that the final word of correctional officials will receive more 
weight than the words of the Fourth Amendment, potentially opening 
a gateway to transforming correctional facilities into Fourth Amend-
ment-free zones.189  Rather than approving a blanket policy, the Su-
preme Court should have implemented a reasonable, individualized 
suspicion standard in order to strike an effective balance between a 
detainee’s privacy rights and prison security concerns; this action 
would have preserved the limited constitutional rights afforded to de-
tainees.190 
                                                        
 184.  See supra text accompanying note 46; see also Adam Cohen, Strip Searches: The Su-
preme Court’s Disturbing Decision, TIME.COM (Apr. 6, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04 
/06/strip-searches-the-supreme-courts-disturbing-decision/ (“[W]hen the government can 
strip-search people who do not wear a seat belt, it can strip-search any of us.”). 
 185.  Cohen, supra note 184 (“[W]hen there is a case in which the freedom at stake is 
crystal clear—the right to not be forced to needlessly lift one’s genitals or squat while 
coughing for a law-enforcement official—the court is firmly focused on the government’s 
important interests in taking it away.”). 
 186.  Id. (“It might seem that in the United States, being pulled over for driving without 
a seat belt should not end with the government ordering you to take off your clothes and 
‘lift your genitals.’  But there is no guarantee that this is the case . . . .”). 
 187.  Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1530 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 188.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 189.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 190.  See supra Part IV.C. 
